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Abstract
International water agreements are often used as mechanisms for fostering
and institutionalizing political cooperation. Yet, since water resources in
many places are being driven to the edge of their natural limits, a number
of international organizations have formulated legal principles and norms
aimed at helping states resolve water disputes. While states have been
urged to adopt these principles, it seems that they often embrace other
less-traditional alternatives that may better address their own political
needs. The aim of this study is to examine why states fail or decline to
adopt several of the general principles of customary law formulated by
these international organizations and to investigate how creative language
is often adapted instead. The principles examined include basin-wide development and management; the appropriation of water according to clearly
defined water rights; and joint management of shared water resources. The
study focuses on three contemporary case studies centering on Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Territories. It concludes that the negotiation over
the legal terminology of agreements between these parties exemplifies the
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power struggle and asymmetries between Israel and its neighbors. Much of
the deadlock in the negotiations was resolved when the parties moved from
their adversarial positions to address the underlying interests, in which a
compromise was forged that captured elements of international law while
still addressing the needs of the dominant riparian. These results indicate
that under asymmetric settings, there is a need for creative legal discourse
rather than an entrenchment of international water law, which has found
to be a recipe for failure.

Introduction
Since water resources are being driven to the edge of their natural limits, today even the most cooperative neighboring states find it difficult to
achieve mutually acceptable arrangements over shared water resources
(McCaffrey 2001). As a means for helping states negotiate resolutions to
water disputes, a number of international bodies have formulated general
legal principles and norms focusing on basin-wide development and management, the appropriation of water according to clearly defined water
rights, and joint management of shared water resources (Benvenisti and
Gvirtzman 1993; Conca et al. 2006). These principles and norms are intended
to change the behavior of states by introducing new principles and norms
of conduct. Among these international bodies are the International Law
Association, which developed the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 2004 Berlin
Rules, and the International Law Commission. Today, nearly all states agree
that the numerous water treaties and other international legal instruments
testify to the existence of customary international law for transboundary
water resources (Dellapenna 2006).
While states are being urged to adopt these principles and norms
(Hayton and Utton 1989), emerging trends in transboundary water regulation suggest that, in fact, states tend to embrace other less-traditional
principles that may better address their own political needs. For example,
Conca et al. in their study on whether governments are converging on
common principles for governing shared river basins found that there
is only weak evidence for the actual adoption of common principles for
regime formation (Conca et al. 2006). Also, Kliot and Shmueli (2001) determined that very few of the institutions they examined corresponded to
the ideal model of institutions for the management of transborder water
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resources, namely, a basin-wide multipurpose institution that treats the
whole basin as a single unit and equitably integrates all riparians. Yet
many of these institutions were nevertheless found to be effective in managing the shared resource. Treaties in basins with multiple riparians are
still often bilateral, and many of these treaties are based on needs rather
than rights, as stipulated by customary law, and the coordination achieved
is limited. In some cases it seems that even if the language of international
law does appear in treaties, it actually has a different meaning there. Such
was the case in the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable
Development of the Mekong River Basin (1995 Mekong River Treaty) that,
although employing the term “basin” treaty, often meant a watercourse,
which is a smaller spatial unit of jurisdiction than a basin (Sneddon and
Fox 2006).
The aim of this study is to examine why states fail or decline to adopt
several of the general principles of customary law formulated by these
international organizations and to identify the creative language that is
adopted instead. The principles to be examined are 1) basin-wide development and management; 2) the appropriation of water according to clearly
defined water rights; and 3) joint management of water resources by all
basin riparians.
To this end, a comparative research design is offered. Three case studies
will be examined in detail, including the water components of the 1994
Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan, the 1995 interim water agreement (“Oslo II”) between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO); and the 2005 agreement between Israel, the Palestinian Authority
and Jordan to conduct feasibility studies for a canal project between the
Red and Dead Seas.
The study first examines the emergence of three core principles in international water law and their potential ability to address asymmetries. Next,
through the three case studies, it seeks to understand why these so-called
“ideal” principles are often not adopted and what alternative principles
might replace them. Finally, it discusses the limits and limitations of the
three principles vis-à-vis their ability to reconcile a negotiation process
steeped in conflict.
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Principles of International Water Law
and Addressing Asymmetries
The Principle of Basin-Wide Management

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the basin became the recognized
unit for developing and managing water resources in individual multipurpose projects. But it was during the 1960s that the concept became widespread in water development (Teclaff 1996). Basin-wide institutions are now
pitched as the most appropriate unit for internalizing all externalities associated with water-land-human interaction. Such water institutions include
river basin councils, commissions, and authorities.
In the last few decades, legal scholars have also agreed that the critical
unit of analysis for international water resources is that of the international
drainage basin. For example, the International Law Association, already in
1951, began endorsing the integrated basin principle (Teclaff 1996). This was
followed the 1966 Helsinki Rules that promoted a holistic approach to water
management at a basin level. In 1986, the scope and definition was widened
by the ILA to encompass interrelated transboundary surface and groundwaters as well as transboundary aquifers that are completely dissociated
from any surface water resources (Seoul Rules 1986).

The Principle of Water Rights
Most legal systems today recognize and protect the property aspects of
water rights (Solanes 2001). International law strives to delineate those
riparian state rights to international water resources (Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993). The underlying rationale for establishing water rights is that a
clear definition of who is entitled to use the water will reduce uncertainty
and conflict (Pradhan and Meinzen-Dick 2001). This is in line with neoclassical economics, which see property rights as a fundamental concept
of development (Molle 2004). Thus, the “right” terminology has penetrated
many of the legal instruments that seek to articulate or establish international water law. For example, the Helsinki Rules put forth the notion of
legal rights to water in many of its clauses (Helsinki Rules 1966). Similarly,
the Watercourse Convention stresses the right of watercourse states to utilize the watercourse (Article 5). The Berlin Rules, though not setting rights
as a guideline for appropriating water, stress the right to have access to
water (Berlin Rules 2004).
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The Principle of Joint Management
Navigation laid the groundwork for a legal or administrative unity of the
river basin in politically divided basins. This sense of management unity
was built upon as the non-navigation demands and the technological means
to meet those demands grew. Indeed, in the United States from the 1940s to
the 1970, a series of river basin commissions were established. During the
1940s and 1950s, basin authorities emerged throughout the world: in India,
Sri Lanka, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Australia, and other countries. These
took a variety of forms. Some only coordinated planning while others established a joint mechanism to govern the basin. In a coordinated structure
each party has its own institutions that coordinate some of their activities.
In a joint structure the activities were carried out by a joint institution to
which the parties delegated authority (Haddad et al. 1999).
Acknowledging the benefits of cooperative water management, it seems
that the international community has often advocated a high intensity of
cooperation in the form of joint management structure. For example, the
1997 Watercourse Convention establishes the general obligation to cooperate
(Article 8), and the management required for cooperation (Article 24) called
for the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions. Similarly, the
Berlin Rules call for the establishment of a joint management arrangement
to ensure equitable and sustainable use of water (Article 64).
These water law principles were developed to create a more level
playing field and offset local asymmetries. To some extent, this position
comports with the international legal theory that states are equal under
international law, and, because of that equality, they are supposed to cooperate and negotiate in good faith. By requiring states to recognize the equality of sovereigns, and by obligating them to cooperate and negotiate in good
faith, international law ensures that weaker states are dealt with fairly and
justly by their “bigger siblings.”
The next section examines in detail three case studies in order to understand the applicability of these “ideal” principles to an asymmetrical setting
and alternative principles that might replace them if these principles are
not adopted.
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Middle Eastern Water Agreements

Background on the Israeli-Arab Water Agreements
Most of Israel’s water resources are transboundary. Israelis, Jordanians,
and the Palestinians share the lower basin of the Jordan River (see fig. 5-1),
whose main flow comes from tributaries located in Lebanon and Syria
that discharge some 1,250 million cubic meters (MCM) annually (Soffer
and Kliot 1988). These waters are used both as a potable water supply of
the metropolis of Amman, through the King Abdullah Canal, and for the
water supply in Israel, through the Israeli National Water Carrier, built in
1964. Israelis and the Palestinians also share the Mountain Aquifer, which
supplies 672 MCM per year, according to the Oslo Interim Agreement.
Israel uses nearly 80% of the water in this aquifer, and the Palestinians
use the remainder (Trottier 1999). The Mountain Aquifer provides pristine water to both sides, although it is highly susceptible to pollution due
to its karstic structure; thus, its management requires a high degree of
cooperation (Haddad et al. 1999). Finally, there is the Coastal Aquifer, the
southern tip of which underlies the Gaza Strip. Until the 2005 disengagement process, it provided water to both the Palestinian population and the
Jewish settlements of the Strip. Today it is the only water source for the
Palestinians in Gaza.
Despite the shared nature of the resources, both Israel and Jordan, in
the 1950s, announced unilateral plans to develop the Jordan Basin. Israel
planned the diversion of the northern Jordan River, through the construction
of a carrier, to the Coastal Plain and Negev Desert (Naff and Matson 1984).
Jordan opposed this out-of-basin water transfer and instead announced its
intention to irrigate the Jordan Valley by channeling the Yarmouk River
into the King Abdullah Channel, which is part of the same basin. As Israel
started implementing its plan, a series of border clashes erupted between
Israel and Syria; these clashes escalated to an armed conflict in 1953 (Wolf
and Ross 1992). But even earlier the United States sent Eric Johnston as a
special envoy to the region with the mission of reaching regional agreement
between the riparian states on the division of the waters of the Jordan and
Yarmouk Rivers. Johnston’s 1951 proposal was rejected by all countries,
as was his 1955 version. Within a decade, the tension over water, coupled
with the regional border dispute, led to numerous political clashes over
water between Israel and Jordan, some of which developed into significant
military confrontations.
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Figure 5-1. The geopolitical units in the Jordan River basin.
Source: Soffer and Kliot 1988.
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After the Six-Day War of 1967 the geopolitical map of the Middle East
changed dramatically. Apart from Israel’s victory in terms of land and borders, it also gained water resources by acquiring two of the three Jordan
River headwaters, as well as winning control over the Mountain Aquifer previously held by Jordan. Israeli military rule extended to all civilian
affairs in the territory of the West Bank, including water (Tal 2002). This
meant that drilling any well in the West Bank required an Israeli permit.
Israel granted only 23 of these to Palestinians from 1967 to 1990 (Awartani
1992). In contrast, during the same period Israel exploited this water to
address the growing political pressure of its agricultural sector. Israel has
also gradually increased its use of the Yarmouk and during the 1970s and
‘1980s had plans to revive the Mediterranean Sea–Dead Sea Canal first visualized a century earlier by the Zionist movement (Varadi 1990).
While Israel was developing the resource, Jordan and Syria did not sit
idly by. In the mid-1970s, as Jordan faced water shortages in its main cities
of Amman and Irbid, it revived its plan to jointly build a large storage
facility on the Yarmouk with Syria. The plan for a “Unity Dam” was again
discussed by the two at the end of the 1980s and ‘90s, causing considerable tension in Israel, which initially opposed its construction (Hof 1995;
Keinan 2005). As all freshwater use has reached the limits of its availability
in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Jordan, tensions over scarce
water have increased.
The Madrid peace conference in 1991 and the many negotiations that
followed marked a turning point in water relations. In Madrid, two parallel
negotiating tracks—the bilateral and multilateral—were established. The
former referred to direct negotiations between Israel and each of its immediate Arab neighbors, with the exception of the Palestinians, who, at the
time, were included in the Jordanian delegation at the insistence of Israel
(Rubinstein 2004). The latter focused on key issues that concerned the entire
Middle East and that might generate confidence-building measures (Peters
1996). Each track was divided into groups that included the water issue.
While the work on both tracks was progressing, Israel and the Palestinians
initiated a secret negotiating track outside the framework of the Madrid
conference that resulted in the Oslo I Accord, signed in September 1993.
That accord, which announced the establishment of a Palestinian interim
authority, also noted the need for cooperation in the field of water. Subsequent to Oslo I, Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)
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in September 1995 signed the Oslo II Interim Agreement, in which article
40 of Annex III addressed issues of water and sewage.
The moment it became clear that Israel and the PLO were about to sign
Oslo I, the bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan intensified. Water was
the last and most contentious issue resolved in those negotiations, which
came to an end with the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty in October 1994; Annex II of the treaty pertains to the two countries’ shared water.
The Israel-Jordanian agreement set in motion the plan to develop the
Dead Sea area; both sides declared the Jordan Rift Valley a development
zone and established the Trilateral Economic Committee and Jordan Rift
Valley (JRV) Steering Committee. Finally, in April 2005, after 3 years of
negotiations, a feasibility study was signed for the environmental and social
assessment of the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance study.
The next section examines briefly the negotiations over the language
negotiated and adopted in each of the three agreements.

Negotiating International Language

The Israeli-Jordanian agreement
A Jordanian demand that Israel reorganize their respective water rights was
raised in 1992 while both countries discussed the common agenda for the
coming water negotiations. Water rights were important for Jordan, whose
use of the Jordan River had been diminished by Israel’s extensive use of that
water (Haddadin 2001) and in light of the Palestinians obtaining reorgani
zation of their own water rights in talks with Israel (Izraeli 2005). Water rights
are based on several factors, such as hydrology, geography, and historical
use and needs; the weight of each factor is not determined universally but
rather based on the circumstances of each case. It was thus clear to Israel
that setting the allocation on the basis of disputable algorithms would result
in long-term disagreements (Shamir 2003). Even if the weight of each factor
were agreed upon, Israel feared that Jordan’s water needs in the future would
change, which may result in a demand for adjustment (Sabel 2005). Finally,
Israel was concerned that recognizing its water rights on the Yarmouk might
allow its neighbor to raise counter-claims on the Jordan River, which Israel
wished to leave as an exclusively Israeli water body (Izraeli 2005). Instead,
Israel preferred a clear division of water based on a definition of the water
source and location, quantities, qualities, and pricing (Shamir 2003). The disagreement was resolved by both sides putting forward the notion of securing
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their respective “rightful water share,” the meaning of which was left to be
defined in the next phase of negotiation (Common Agenda 1993).
As the controversy over water rights continued, the technique of incorporating both sides’ needs in the treaty language defused the deadlock.
This occurred only when the formula of “rightful allocation” was introduced at the late stages of negotiations. “Rightful allocation” implies that
the Jordanian rights are the allocation both sides agree upon (Rizner 2005).
This term served to provide a psychological reference to “rights” that was
important to Jordan while basing the allocations on what is specified in the
agreement, which was important to Israel (Shamir 2003).
Next, there was a need to clarify the meaning of “rightful allocation”
and to divide the water between the two states accordingly. Jordan’s interpretation of its respected water rights was to receive from Israel 200 MCM
per year of potable water from the Jordan River, half of it from the Sea of
Galilee, also known as Lake Kinneret (Haddadin 2001), on the basis that
the lake is an international watercourse where Jordan is a riparian (Rizner
2005). Israel, in contrast, argued that Jordan is not riparian to the lake itself
(Katz-Oz 2005). Thus, Israel opposed including any reference in the treaty
to the Jordan River as a “shared basin” (Sabel 2005) and insisted that the
term “Lake Kinneret” not appear in the treaty language (Shamir 2005). As
a result, although it was clear that the source of some of the water provided
to Jordan is the lake itself, the lake’s name was not mentioned in the treaty,
nor was there any reference to the Jordan River as a shared basin. Instead,
it stated that the source would be “from the Jordan River directly upstream
from the Deganya gates on the river” while the meaning of “Jordan River”
was deliberately left ambiguous (Sabel 2005).
Finally, there was a need to set the degree of cooperation and dependency required to execute the treaty provision. Israel was concerned that
setting up a joint management structure in which both countries share and
develop the basin resources might put the burden of droughts and funding
new water resources on it, as it has more water alternatives (Rizner 2006). It
was also concerned about any interpretation that might describe the treaty
and its institutions as a symbol of Israel’s control in the basin (Shatner 2005).
Consequently, the Joint Water Committee (JWC) was set up to oversee the
treaty implementation and established coordination mechanisms rather
than a joint or a cooperative framework. These were restricted to cooperation in developing plans for purposes of increasing water supplies and
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improving water use efficiency within the context of bilateral, regional, or
international cooperation.
Figure 5-2 presents the language employed by both sides and how the
differences in jargon were reconciled in the negotiation process.

Figure 5-2. Language evolution in the Israeli-Jordanian negotiations.

The Israeli-Palestinian agreement
While Jordan consented to discussing “allocations,” the Palestinians insisted
on the division of water based on water rights (Shamir 1998). As a result,
when the multilateral water group met in Geneva just after the Madrid conference to discuss regional water issues, the Palestinians insisted that their
water rights be negotiated; in response, Israel argued that this was a political
topic that was outside the multilateral and technical scope of the discussion
(Izraeli 2005). Instead, Israel suggested that until this issue was discussed
during the permanent negotiations phase, both sides should adopt a “pragmatic approach” of dividing the water according to the future needs of the
Palestinians (Kantor 2005). The Palestinians refused to discuss water needs
independently of water rights and left the multilateral water group until this
issue returned to the agenda (Haddad 2004).
The Israeli objection to discussing Palestinian water rights based on the
“reasonable and equitable” criteria originates with the fear that this term
was not quantifiable (Kinarti 2006), and thus may build great expectations
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on the Palestinian side (Rizner 2005). Israel was further concerned about
water rights providing the Palestinians fixed entitlement to water even
during a regional drought (Kantor 2005). The Palestinians, on the other
hand, opted for water rights as leverage for land rights (Haddad 2004).
Another point of disagreement was the Palestinians’ wish that the
agreement include “joint” management over the entire basin and a reference to them as riparian to the Dead Sea (Sabel 2005). For the Palestinians,
terminology commonly used in international law was assumed to assure
them the support of the international community (Attili 2006). Furthermore,
attaining a joint basin-wide agreement and even a joint water utility might
have provided the Palestinians with the power to reallocate existing water
uses, which were dominated by Israel outside the West Bank (Attili 2004).
Thus, not surprisingly, Israel opposed such terminology and opted for a
coordinated management structure over the West Bank that would better
reflect the existing status quo. Yet, it also suggested augmenting the Palestinians’ water supply through a desalinization plant on the Israeli coast at
Hadera (Katz-Oz 2005).
A breakthrough for the Palestinians occurred when Abraham Katz-Oz,
the head of the Israeli negotiation team in the multilateral talks, agreed to
acknowledge the Palestinians’ water rights on an equitable basis as well as
their affinity to the Dead Sea. Once this was accepted there was no return
and these issues were included in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on the
interim self-governance arrangements signed in Washington on September
13, 1993 (Annex III, Article 1). Yet many of the Israeli negotiators who were
against acknowledging the Palestinians’ water rights decided on a strategy
of postponing the clarification of the meaning of “equitable water rights” to
the permanent status negotiations. In the meantime, the Israeli strategy was
to continue to advance water allocation based on the pragmatic approach
(Kinarti 2006).
Next, in 1994 the Cairo Agreement was signed, Annex II (Article II) of
which touched on shared water in the Gaza Strip. The agreement announced
that a subcommittee would deal with water issues of mutual interest while
its scope and scale were restricted, allowing the water sovereignty of each
side to be maintained. The Cairo Agreement was followed by intensified
negotiations that led, a year later, to the Taba Agreement, often called Oslo II,
Article 40 of which addressed water and sewage. The clash between allocation based on rights versus allocation based on pragmatism was resolved in
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the negotiations only when a third approach was adopted: negotiating the
Palestinians’ interim water needs on the basis of population patterns and
irrigation needs. Once the allocation was agreed, the Palestinian allotment
was to be presented in the negotiated agreement as water rights based on
reasonable and equitable criteria, again without clarifying what “reasonable
and equitable” actually meant (Rizner 2005).
At Israel’s insistence the scale of the agreement was restricted to the
West Bank rather than the entire basin (see fig. 5-1). Narrowing the scale
prevented the Palestinians from gaining control of the major water source
of Israel, located on the western fringe of the Mountain Aquifer outside
the West Bank zone. To ensure that the agreement would not affect the
Kinneret or the Jordan River, Israel made sure that it did not recognize the
Palestinians as riparian to the Jordan basin; the agreement did not even
mention this water resource (Rizner 2005). Instead, it said that “various”
water resources would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations,
without clarifying the meaning of “various.”
Finally, to address the Israeli demand, a coordinating mechanism was
set up to administer the agreement, with decisions made on a veto basis.
Coordination should be understood in this context as an alternative to joint
management. “Joint” would suggest ownership and “management” of a
resource versus coordination, which indicates that each side is sovereign
in its domain but agrees that certain matters can be managed together.
The only shared structure was the establishment of an enforcement arm

Figure 5-3. Language evolution in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
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of the JWC, termed Joint Supervision and Enforcement Team (JSET). The
assumption was that a joint structure for enforcement would be inevitable
since this would be the only way to prevent disagreements.
Figure 5-3 presents the language advanced by both sides and how the
differences in terms were reconciled in the negotiation process.

The Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian agreement
Following a request by Jordan at the beginning of 2002, a World Bank Technical Assistance Mission visited the Hashemite Kingdom. The purpose of
the visit was to assess the support of both Israel and Jordan for the Red
Sea–Dead Sea Canal with the aim of saving the Dead Sea and providing
desalinated freshwater to the region and especially to Amman (Red Sea–
Dead Sea 2002a). The two countries agreed to establish a small joint steering
committee that included the World Bank and that would prepare the Terms
of Reference (TOR) required for the project (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2002b). Several months later, the principles for the TOR were submitted for acceptance
by the Israeli Ministry of Regional Cooperation. The draft called for joint
examination of the project by the two governments with the involvement
of the World Bank, USAID, and/or the U.S. State Department. Both Jordan
and Israel preferred a route entirely in Jordan. This would exclude some
of the Israeli pressure groups that might oppose the project and would
make it eligible for World Bank funding that only developing countries
can receive (Benvenisti and Gvirtzman 1993). Yet the early draft addressed
neither the scale of the examination nor the number of alternative routes
to be examined (Israeli Government 2002). Following the early draft, the
need to further advance the project was boosted by the Johannesburg World
Summit on Sustainable Development and the Third Water Forum in Kyoto,
both of which stressed the vision of saving the Dead Sea through the “peace
conduit” (Johannesburg Summit 2002).
A year later, a more mature draft was issued by the World Bank. Following the Bank’s insistence, the draft now included the Palestinians
as riparians in the agreement along with Israel and Jordan (Blitz 2006).
It also paved the way for an examination of the water resources of the
entire Jordan basin and for establishing regional joint institutions to govern the TOR (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2003a). Finally, it acknowledged the need
for consultation with the public and implicitly the entitlement of all basin
parties (including the Palestinians) to water and land rights in the basin.
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Broadening both the scale and scope of investigation raised strong objection
on behalf of Israel, while the Palestinians insisted on these changes (Red
Sea–Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project 2003b). For the Palestinians, an
agreement that touched on water and land issues in the entire basin, with
reference to international law, was assumed to provide them with leverage
for obtaining their “reasonable and equitable” water and land share in the
permanent status negotiations with Israel (Attili 2006). In contrast, for Israel
such an agreement might prejudge the results of the permanent status talks
with the Palestinians and might infringe on its sovereignty and water and
land resources, including Lake Kinneret and the Dead Sea (Keidar 2005;
Blitz 2006). Instead, Israel suggested that the Palestinians’ participation be
examined at a later stage, in accordance with the progress on the final negotiations and to decouple the TOR from the regional water use, the peace
process, and the upper basin riparians (Alaster 2006).
Despite pressure from both Jordan and the World Bank to accept the
early draft (Bein 2006), Israel’s strong objection to the 2003 draft resulted
in a revised draft published by the World Bank (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2004).
The new version of the TOR excluded much of the customary law language
found in the previous draft, including any reference to Lebanon and Syria
as upper riparians, the option for a joint management structure governed
by a regional institution, and the status of the Palestinians as riparians.
Instead, the TOR included a statement that the agreement will not prejudice the riparian rights of any of the parties, that the nature of cooperation remains to be studied, and that the parties status would change from
riparians to “beneficiary party” (Red Sea–Dead Sea 2004). The “beneficiary”
language adopted satisfied the Israeli demand for the passive status of the
Palestinians (Alaster 2006; Yinon 2006) while the term “party” addressed
the Palestinians’ needs for recognition as equal parties to the agreement
(Attili 2006). The statement also addressed the Palestinians’ wish that the
agreement not infringe on the rights of Syria and Lebanon, which were not
involved in the negotiations, while for Israel it enabled decoupling of the
agreement from the final negotiations.
However, despite the many compromises reached in the 2004 TOR
version, Israel still objected to it. Israel wished to modify the objective of
the study from saving the Dead Sea to a technical study that focuses on
examining only the convenience route preferable to Jordan and Israel (Blitz
2006). Reframing the objectives of the agreement would have lowered the
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importance of an investigation into the management of the water uses in
the entire basin, an issue that was problematic for both Jordan and Israel
(Alaster 2006). However, the World Bank continued to insist on the need to
see the TOR in a wider regional context that includes the peace and water
management of the entire basin (Yinon 2006).
The breakthrough in the negotiations came just after the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and with the help of some more creative
drafting (Yinon 2006). In the fourth draft of the agreement, the basin water
study was replaced by policy statements each country issued on water
resources management indicating that the nature of cooperation was to
be studied rather than pointing toward joint management (Red Sea–Dead
Sea 2005). Finally, the objectives of the study were framed to take on the
semblance of a technical agreement, as requested by Jordan and Israel.
This affected the parties involved in the negotiations on the Israeli side: the
professional environmental community that headed the negotiations was
replaced by the Israeli Water Commission team that now also addressed
the political realities of negotiations in a conflict area. Politicizing the negotiation process further excluded from the negotiation process the examination of other alternatives for the conveyance. Finally, in April 2005, the

Figure 5-4. Language evolution in the Red–Dead negotiations.
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three beneficiaries signed an agreement to launch a feasibility study for
the environmental and social assessment for the Red Sea–Dead Sea Water
Conveyance study.
Figure 5-4 presents the language advanced by both the Palestinians and
the Israelis and shows how the differences in language were reconciled in
the negotiation process.

Creative Language to Circumvent Political Realities
Water problems are often characterized as “wicked” problems that face
multiple and conflicting interests over the use of integrated natural systems such as an aquifer or a watershed (Scholz and Stiftel 2005). To solve
these problems in an equitable and optimal manner, certain principles of
international water law call for a higher degree of physical and institutional
integration, often at a basin-wide scale, and a clearer definition of water
rights. These principles presuppose the easing of existing power asymmetries between parties and prevent unilateral development activities that
ignore the rights of other basin riparians (Molle et al. 2006).
In our case study, by requiring Israel to allocate water according to
clearly defined Palestinian water rights, all riparian water rights are recognized, regardless of their relative economic, military, or other power.
That recognition, theoretically, would prevent a more powerful state from
unilaterally negating or diminishing the water rights of a weaker riparian.
Similarly, by requiring a multilateral approach (e.g., joint management)
to the administration of the Jordan Basin and the Mountain Aquifer by
all basin riparians, the objectives and designs of the more powerful state
would be subject to the full cooperation of the weaker riparian.
Against this assumption, it seems that real-life experience often deviates
from the ideal legal structures. For example, Kliot and Shmueli (2001), while
analyzing nine major river basins, found that in only a minority of them
a high level of cooperation in the form of joint management is gained and
only a minority of the multipartite basins has multilateral organizations
in place (Dombrowsky 2005). When it comes to adopting water rights the
situation is not different. In many of the disputes that have been resolved,
particularly on arid or exotic streams, the paradigms used for negotiations
have not been “rights-based” at all—neither on relative hydrography nor
specifically on chronology of use but rather “needs-based” (such as the case
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of Egypt and Sudan in their Nile River agreement from 1929 and 1959). In
the case of basin-wide approaches it seems that there is a gap between real
and ideal legal principles. For example, in 1970 when the United Nations
considered the Helsinki Rules, according to Biswas (1999), some states
objected to the prominence of the drainage basin approach, which can be
interpreted as an infringement on a nation’s sovereignty.
The present study argues that it is unrealistic to expect a powerful riparian (in our case study, Israel) to relinquish its power advantage by accepting
these three water principles, especially when the nature of the water dispute extends beyond water. Thus, a more traditional “bottom-up” approach
is employed to adopt “creative terminology” as a means for circumventing
the volatility inherent in these principles.
Both the negotiation over the legal terminology and the language
adopted were found in themselves to be a manifestation of the power struggle and asymmetries between Israel and its neighbors. It was the weak
riparians—the Jordanians and the Palestinians—that, in order to change
the power balance and enhance their access to land and water resources,
endorsed the language of international law, that is, calling for joint basinwide management based upon water rights, while Israel sought alternative
terminology that would uphold the status quo. This explains why drafting
the water treaties was found to be a complex, lengthy, and often contradictory process, and one associated with high transaction costs. It also explains
why the legal language that was finally adopted is rather ambiguous as
ambiguity enabled virtual consent, which in turn allowed each side to
assume that its own language dominates the treaty.
Much of the deadlock was resolved only when the parties moved from
their adversarial positions to address the interests behind the positions,
where a compromise was forged that captures elements of international
law while still addressing the needs of the stronger riparian. For example,
the adoption of rightful allocation terminology in the case of Israel and
Jordan, and rights based on needs in the case of Israel and the Palestinians.
The “rights” terminology came to satisfy the Jordanians or the Palestinians, while the “allocation” or the “needs” terminology came to address
the Israeli needs. The Red–Dead talks also exposed an integrative stage of
negotiation during which the parties started to add benefits to the agreements. This is the “beneficiary party” definition, which helped bypass any
allocation and recognition based upon water “rights.”
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This evolution of water conflict negotiation under asymmetrical conditions explains why the language adopted deviated from the recommended
international legal norms while still managing to address the needs of the
weak riparian. The result was often in adopting only minimal and vague
definitions that capture the spirit of international law principles but also
allowing the freedom to tailor the agreements to the specific asymmetries
of these case studies. Yet, it seems that while Israel was willing to compromise on the rights issue and the nature of cooperation, on the spatial scale
the treaty’s language still reflects its power inequities. In fact, in all three
agreements the mandate of the regime does not go beyond parts of the
basin that may endanger Israeli sovereignty and water and land control.

The Weakness of Creative Language
Although the study’s aim is not to identify the ramifications of following
these non-traditional language alternatives, attention should be paid to
the long-term implications of the language adopted—especially given its
abundant ambiguity and repeated failure to change the water status quo.
In the case of the Israeli-Jordanian water agreement, this “creative ambiguity” was already found to be destructive, as both sides found it difficult
to clarify under conflict (Fischhendler 2008). In the case of Israel-Palestinian agreement, due to the language adopted, some do not even consider
their allocations under the interim agreement to reflect their water rights
as based on reasonable and equitable criteria (Attili 2006). Some international scholars have also criticized many of the institutional components of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement as dressing up domination as
“co-operation” (Selby 2003) or as an imposed-order regime that benefits
the Israeli side at the expense of Palestinian water (Zeitoun 2007). Consequently, the Palestinians have stated that in the final negotiations they
must not repeat the language mistakes made in the Oslo agreement (Husseni 2006). As a result, the 2000 water agreement draft agreed at Camp
David (that was to replace the Oslo agreement) included more explicit
language of international law, as it contains both references to “equitable
and reasonable” and water rights language (Sher 2006). This entails the
risk behind the use of such creative language in that it is still adopted in
order to allow the more powerful state to cajole, or even force, the weaker
state into submission. At the very least, by using its position of power, the
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more powerful party can protect the status quo, which typically favors
the stronger party.
Also in the case of the Red–Dead negotiations, many international and
Israeli NGOs are dissatisfied with the exclusion of the entire basin, or at
least the lower basin, from the feasibility study. As a result, many of these
NGOs refer to the negative environmental externalities and inferior economic solutions that are adopted with the nonbasin approach (Bein 2011;
Gavrieli et al. 2002).

Conclusion
Negotiations in conflict areas over water resources are often conducted
between unequal partners, with each bringing to the negotiation table considerations that go beyond water (Lowi 1993). These conditions can often
create conflicting patterns of interests such that under conflict conditions
a basically nonpolitical issue, such as water allocation, can become politicized. These conditions, in addition to stochastic power asymmetry, were
often found to impede cooperation in many environmental and especially
water problems (UNEP 2006). This suggests that the Israeli-Palestinian-
Jordanian case is not exceptional. A more realistic language that better
reflects the political and power asymmetries but still acknowledges the
importance of the existing rules of customary law turns the Middle Eastern
example to a possible option for other regions facing water disputes.
This linguistic compromises forged are based on the fact that all players
had specific objectives in entering into negotiations and that a failure to
reach an accord would result in harm to both parties. This was clearly the
case regarding the Dead Sea water conduit since such an agreement upon
development would provide benefits to all parties.
While the solutions crafted by the parties have not been adopted by
other states or regions, they constitute examples of creative decision making that might someday be adopted elsewhere under similar asymmetrical
conditions. Ultimately, the Middle Eastern water experience teaches us that
despite attempts to establish a “top-down” approach for the development
of international water law for facilitating the drafting of water treaties, a
broader approach that acknowledges the volatility, unique characteristics,
and asymmetries inherent in these situations must be adopted. Otherwise
the result may be no agreement at all. Yet, this study also highlights that
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the negotiations do not occur in a vacuum but against the backdrop of
asymmetrical power balance. This implies that the hegemonic state often
is the one that set the tune in how the creative language would looks like.
Acknowledging the political realties in crafting legal language for agreements still leaves us asking who typically comes up with the alternative
mechanism or alternative principle—the stronger or the weaker state? It can
be argued that the weaker state has an incentive to be creative in its relations with its more powerful neighbor; however, we can also could argue
that, because of its stature, the more powerful state is in a better position to
formulate and suggest alternatives. The second explanation might fit with
the conclusions of this paper, namely that Israel, as the hegemonic riparian,
sought alternative terminology as a means of circumventing the Jordanian
and Palestinian endorsement of traditional international law concepts.
At the same time, recognizing the importance of creative terminology
implies that skillful negotiators and implementers able to exploit openings crafted by ambiguous language are assets that weaker parties need
to cultivate.
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